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Enlightenment and Religion: Rupture or Continuity?
Iluminismo e religião: ruptura ou continuidade?
RESUMO
ABSTRACT
This article, through a review of a portion of the 
relevant literature, problematizes the way in which the 
connection between the Enlightenment and religion 
has traditionally been explained, principally by a 
historiography excessively focused on the 18th century 
French experience. Alternatively, this article argues that 
“continuity,” rather than “rupture,” more adequately 
describes this relationship. However, continuity, 
as understood here, excludes neither tension nor 
transformation. If, on the one hand, the Enlightenment 
is much more akin to religion than has been previously 
recognized, on the other hand, it has to a great extent 
shaped modern understanding of religion. This revision 
of the relationship between the Enlightenment and 
religion suggests the need to rethink the very identity of 
the Enlightenment and the issue of secularization. The 
article uses as a guide the German debate surrounding 
the question, “What is the Enlightenment?” It concludes 
with an analysis of Kant’s famous contribution to this 
debate.
A partir de uma revisão de parte da literatura recente 
sobre o tema, este artigo busca problematizar a maneira 
pela qual Iluminismo e religião foram tradicionalmente 
articulados, sobretudo por uma historiografia 
excessivamente focada na experiência do século XVIII 
francês. Em contraposição, este artigo argumenta que 
“continuidade” é um termo que expressa de forma mais 
adequada essa relação do que o termo “ruptura”. No 
entanto, continuidade, como se defende, não exclui 
tensões nem tampouco transformações. Se, de um lado, 
o Iluminismo é muito mais próximo da religião do que 
se reconhece; de outro, ele modelou em larga medida o 
entendimento moderno da religião. A revisão da relação 
entre Iluminismo e religião implica também repensar 
a própria identidade do Iluminismo e a questão da 
secularização. O artigo toma o debate alemão em torno 
da questão “o que é Iluminismo?” como fio condutor do 
comentário, que se encerra com uma análise da famosa 
contribuição de Kant a esse debate.
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Raised for the first time at the end of the 18th century, 
the question, “What is the Enlightenment?” has never lost its 
relevance. To a great extent, the sustained interest granted to 
this question is a result of the centrality that the Enlightenment 
has assumed since the French Revolution in a narrative of the 
emergence of modernity as a radical rupture with a fanatical, 
tyrannical past. According to this view, the Enlightenment 
is usually conceived as a secular, rational, egalitarian, and 
democratic program for human liberation. Today, when the 
revolutionary horizon has given way to a grimmer outlook, a 
growing skepticism has arisen about technological progress, 
religion has reasserted itself in public life, and populist 
authoritarian leaders use digital media to threaten democratic 
institutions, the Enlightenment and its legacy are receiving 
renewed attention. But which Enlightenment? While the 
philosophical, secular, and liberal understanding of the 
Enlightenment dominates the general public view and still finds 
its defenders in specialized scholarship, this interpretation has 
also been vigorously critiqued and challenged by the latter 
since at least the 1980s.
This article is not intended to heap either praise or 
reproach upon a supposed “Enlightenment project.”1 Nor is 
it an overview of the “state of the field” of research on the 
Enlightenment — which would probably be impossible anyway, 
considering the vast sprawl of empirical and thematic studies 
produced in recent years. It does, however, engage with a 
significant portion of recent literature to critically discuss 
some recent developments in the study of the Enlightenment, 
with the following question in mind: How can historical research 
contribute to an effective understanding of the Enlightenment 
as a useful past, without falling prey to what Michel Foucault 
called the “blackmail of the Enlightenment”? (1984, p. 43-
44). Although there exists a variety of prominent debates in 
the current discussion of the Enlightenment, I will limit myself 
to addressing one that I believe deserves more thorough 
attention: the question of its relationship with religion. To be 
sure, “religion has returned to the Enlightenment,” as Jonathan 
1 - This expression, 
usually attributed to 
Alasdair MacIntyre, 
expresses a wide-
spread understanding 
of the Enlightenment 
as a coherent philo-
sophical project that 
gave rise to moderni-
ty and has continued 
until the present. My 
approach here will be 
more historiograph-
ic, focusing on the 
assorted arguments, 
institutions, and cul-
tural practices of the 
17th and 18th centu-
ries to which the name 
“Enlightenment” has 
been credibly applied.
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Sheehan has pointed out (2003, p. 1062). Insofar as, more 
than any other period, the 18th century is understood as the 
cradle of secular modernity, the reintroduction of religion to the 
Enlightenment should force us to rethink not only the concept 
of “Enlightenment,” but also the conceptual pair “religion/
secularism,” thereby questioning comfortable narratives about 
the process of “secularization.” According to a good deal of the 
recent literature, “continuity,” rather than “rupture,” is a better 
term to express the relationship between the Enlightenment 
and religion. However, I argue that continuity excludes neither 
tension nor transformation. In fact, the very concept of 
“religion” (as opposed to the “secular”), which remains current 
in both academic and every-day discourse, is in large measure 
a complex product of the Enlightenment. Starting from the 
presupposition that the opinions of its contemporary observers 
and participants are a useful guide to this discussion, I will 
take the late 18th-century German debate on the subject as my 
point of departure. 
Religious Enlightenment
In December 1783, the Prussian journal Berlinische 
Monatsschrift published a response, written by the Protestant 
pastor and theologian Johann Friedrich Zöllner, to an article it 
had published several months before by an official in the Prussian 
state bureaucracy, Johann Erich Biester, who questioned the 
need for marriages to be performed by clergy. Biester claimed 
that a good portion of the population saw the presence of 
priests at weddings as “ridiculous,” and that converting 
them into a purely civil ceremony would serve the cause of 
“enlightenment” (Aufklärung). Zöllner saw this argument as a 
sign of confusion, dangerous for public morality, that was being 
promoted “in the name of enlightenment,” leading him to the 
question, in a footnote, “What is enlightenment? This question, 
which is almost as important as what is truth, should indeed be 
answered before one begins to enlighten! And still I have never 
found it answered?” (ZÖLLNER apud SCHMIDT 2011, p. 44)2.
2 - For more on this 
debate, see Schmidt, 
1996. 
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3 - For critical analy-
ses of “Counter-En-
lightenment,” see 
Pocock, 1999 and 
Schmidt, 2015. For a 
productive use of this 
concept, in a study of 
Catholic opposition to 
the French philoso-
phes, see McMahon, 
2002.
4 - On the Wednesday 
Society, see Birtsch, 
1996. 
One possible interpretation of this episode—which  sparked a 
wide-ranging public discussion that spread to other newspapers, 
lasted over a decade, and included the participation of illustrious 
names like Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant—would be 
to take Zöllner’s reply as a reaction against the Enlightenment, 
a manifestation of what later became known as “Counter 
Enlightenment” (Gegenaufklärung), in large measure thanks 
to the homonymous essay by Isaiah Berlin (1980 [1955])3. 
However, as James Schmidt (1996) has shown, what was at 
stake in this exchange and the debate it unleashed was not 
a conflict between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, 
but rather one within the Enlightenment concerning its 
meaning, goals, and limits. Far from being an unambiguous and 
homogeneous question, to which the only possible responses 
would be acceptance or rejection, “enlightenment,” for its 
immediate observers and participants, was a topic of debate—
just like it is today. And, in this debate, clerics and theologians 
like Zöllner played a key role. 
It is important to point out that, in spite of his objections to 
the restriction of the role of the Church in wedding ceremonies, 
Zöllner was hardly a reactionary fanatic or an enemy of the 
Enlightenment. In fact, he was directly involved in activities 
that were seen as “enlightened” and in the institutions of 
sociability and publication that made up the new “public sphere” 
in the 18th century, as demonstrated by his role in sparking 
this debate about the meaning of the Enlightenment. Zöllner 
was a pedagogical reformer, author of a popular manual for 
divulging philosophical-scientific ideas. Moreover, he was also a 
Freemason, and, along with Biester, a member of the influential 
“Wednesday Society” (Mittwochgesellschaft), a secret society 
composed of self-proclaimed “friends of enlightenment,” closely 
tied to the Berlinische Monatsschrift.4 In his role as member 
of the clergy, Zöllner belonged to a group of theologians and 
pastors known as “Neologues.” Making use of the tools, honed 
in German universities, of critical learning, the Neologues 
advocated a reading of Christianity that de-emphasized dogmas 
and rituals in favour of the moral and practical dimension of 
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their teachings.5 For “enlightened” theologians like Zöllner, 
“faith” and “reason” were inseparable, since Christian revelation 
confirmed so-called “natural theology,” that is, certain 
foundational and universal principles of religion and morality 
that were accessible to human reason. Thus, there was also 
no incompatibility between Christianity and “enlightenment,” 
since both, when correctly understood, were opposed to both 
“superstition” and “fanaticism.”
Contradicting Paul Hazard (1935) and Peter Gay (1966), 
who defined the Enlightenment as a quintessentially secular 
phenomenon—the advent of “modern paganism”, as Gay put it, 
or, as Anthony Pagden still claims, a “profoundly anti-religious 
movement”—this type of “religious enlightenment,” of which 
Zöllner was a representative, far from being an oxymoron, was 
widely disseminated in the 18th century, as the literature on 
the topic has amply demonstrated (HAZARD 2015 [1935]; GAY 
1977 [1966]; PAGDEN 2013, loc. 95)6.
Particularly in majority Protestant regions of Northern 
Europe, the Enlightenment often was closely tied to heterodox 
theological currents, like Arminianism, which, in contrast to 
official dogma sought to promote a tolerant and irenic view of 
faith. According to Richard Sher (1985), what we call “Scottish 
enlightenment” was largely built by the “moderate faction” of 
the Scottish Presbyterian Kirk. This influential group of clergy 
and literati included, among others, the professor of rhetoric 
and belles-lettres Hugh Blair, the historian William Robertson 
and the professor of natural and moral philosophy Adam 
Ferguson. In England, the early-18th century Whig program 
of social reform promoted by Shaftesbury, Joseph Addison, 
and Richard Steele, had close ties to the religious movement 
known as latitudinarianism, which developed in the Church of 
England, in the late-17th and early-18th centuries, as a middle 
way between Puritanism and radical sectarianism, on the one 
hand, and the hardline (High Church) wing of Anglicanism 
that insisted on strict conformity to the Church’s established 
rituals and articles of faith and persecuted dissidents and 
5 - On Neology and its 
place in the complex 
intellectual context of 
Protestant theology, 
historical-philological 
scholarship, and Leib-
niz-Wolffian philos-
ophy that lies at the 
foundation of the Ger-
man Enlightenment, 
see Reill, 1975. See 
also Sorkin, 2008, p. 
115-163. 
6 - The bibliography 
on “religious enlight-
enment” is vast and 
shows no signs of its 
growth slowing. The 
works cited below 
give some idea of its 
size.
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non-conformists (DUARTE 2017).7 In its opposition to the 
“enthusiasm” of the former and the “superstition” of the latter, 
latitudinarianism promoted an understanding of Christianity as 
a type of “civil religion” that emphasized the Christian moral 
traditions of charity and obedience over both the socially 
disruptive experience of direct contact with the Holy Spirit and 
the coerced and authoritarian adherence to “indifferent” rituals 
and doctrines (adiaphora). 
This type of enlightenment experience, which frequently 
took on “clerical, orthodox, and ecclesiastical dimensions” 
(BULMAN 2016, p. 8), was not confined to Protestantism, or 
to a single denomination, country, or political arrangement, 
but spread as far as France, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and 
Catholic Germany and Austria8. Like its Protestant counterpart, 
Catholic enlightenment had its roots in Christian humanism’s 
traditions of biblical exegesis and irenism. In its aspiration to 
patristic purity, it sought to eradicate the excesses of popular 
devotion and baroque religiosity, and, in contrast to the Counter-
Reformation, reorient the Church toward the spiritual labour 
of instruction, charity, and administration of the sacraments. 
Operating beneath the aegis of absolute monarchs, these 
Catholic movements managed to advance, perhaps more than 
any other current of the Enlightenment, a broad reformist 
agenda that included the abolition of the Inquisition, a reduction 
in the number of regular clergy, the strengthening of “national” 
Churches at the expense of the papacy, and civil tolerance for 
Protestants and Jews. (VAN KLEY 2016, p. 291).
According to David Sorkin (2008), in spite of confessional 
and national differences, these various movements were united 
by several common characteristics. Among these, the foremost 
was a conscious search for the middle way of “reasonable” 
belief, a balance between the two divine “lights” of reason 
and Revelation. This search usually involved the adoption of 
the exegetical principle of accommodation, which permitted 
the relativization of parts of the Scriptures as historically 
bounded, while maintaining an essential core of universal truth. 
7 - There was also a 
“dissident Enlight-
enment” in England, 
that is, an enlighten-
ment movement that 
arose among Protes-
tant groups excluded 
from full participation 
in the Church of En-
gland. On this tradi-
tion, see Haakonseen, 
1996. 
8 - On the Catholic 
Enlightenment, see 
Rosenblatt, 2006; 
Lehner, 2011; 2016; 
Lehner; Printy, 2010.
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It also involved the acceptance of the concept of natural 
religion, with the goal of transcending confessional disputes 
through the establishment of a moral consensus that could 
serve as the foundation for a multi-religious civil constitution. 
At the same time, these movements articulated more or less 
broad concepts of religious tolerance, something that, during 
the 16th and 17th centuries, had been restricted to heterodox 
sects and advocates of Raison d’État.9 A third common 
characteristic was the active involvement of its members in the 
emergent Enlightenment public sphere, where they debated a 
variety of issues, not exclusively of a religious nature, beyond 
the restricted circles of clerics and the erudite. Finally, these 
Enlightenments were characterized by a close relationship with 
the modern State, which saw in these moderate interpretations 
of religion a way to overcome religious disputes and strengthen 
national Churches, thereby promoting political stability and 
civil-administrative reform projects. 
Thus, Colin Kidd, in a review published in the London Review 
of Books, offers a synthesis of the recent change in the field. He 
claims that the Enlightenment is no longer viewed exclusively 
as a “secularist fringe,” but rather conceived as “a broader 
movement, encompassing a philosophically sophisticated body 
of liberal believers,” adding that this conception
has become more common over the past thirty years or 
so, with a growing attention among historians to “the 
moderate Enlightenment,” “the religious Enlightenment,” “the 
Enlightenment Bible,” and the role of churches, seminaries, and 
denominational universities as incubators of enlightened values. 
The new historiography focuses on the role of moderate clerics 
in shaping a rational and defensible Christianity purged of both 
folkloric accretions and the unjustifiable metaphysical excesses 
which had fed the zealotries of the early modern wars of religion 
(KIDD 2013, p. 30–31).
According to this new historiography, “continuity” is a 
better term than “rupture” to characterize the relationship 
between the Enlightenment and religion. Or, as John Pocock 
9 - On the idea of reli-
gious tolerance during 
this period, see Grell; 
Porter, 2000; and 
Marshall, 2006.
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put it in the introduction to the first volume of his monumental 
study of Edward Gibbon, “Enlightenment was a product 
of religious debate and not merely a rebellion against it.” 
(POCOCK 1999, p. 5). Of course, continuity does not preclude 
tension or change. 
The definition of the Enlightenment as “irreligious” owes 
in great measure to the persistence of what Pocock called 
the “paradigm of an Enlightenment defined as the activity of 
philosophes” (POCOCK 1999, p. 6-7)—that is, the idea that the 
Enlightenment was essentially a French movement, or better 
yet, Parisian, distinguished by the rational militancy of the gens 
de lettres of Paris, engaged in écrasez l’infâme, in Voltaire’s 
famous expression. There is no doubt that the Encyclopédiste 
movement, associated with Diderot, d’Alembert, Voltaire, 
Helvétius, d’Holbach, Boyer, and La Mettrie, among others, not 
only dominates our representation of the French Enlightenment, 
but also bears the greatest responsibility for the invention of the 
concept of the Enlightenment in the singular (VAN KLEY 2016). 
In addition to being anti-Catholic, anti-Christian, and even 
anti-religious, there is also no doubt that this enlightenment 
was, at least in regards to religion, the best known variant of 
what became known as “the radical Enlightenment,” following 
the works of Margaret Jacob and Jonathan Israel10. However, it 
can be said that this enlightenment was the exception, not the 
norm; one determined by the exceptionality of the philosophes 
themselves as a separate group of scholars, with no intrinsic 
connection to Church, university, or State, and equally 
antagonistic toward France’s two major religious parties, the 
Jansenists and Jesuits. Either way, even in France, the activity 
of the Parisian philosophes comes nowhere near to accounting 
for the vast variety of experiences of “enlightenment.” 
Indeed, the Parisian “High Enlightenment”—whose 
philosophical assault on Christianity did not translate into political 
or social radicalism, but rather comfortably integrated itself into 
the high society of the Ancien Régime (le monde)—pales (or 
at least blushes) in comparison with the “low Enlightenment” 
10 - I use the expres-
sion here with a more 
restricted meaning 
(referring only to the 
anti-Christian activ-
ism of the Encyclo-
paedists) than that 
which Jacob and Isra-
el give it. For a critical 
evaluation of the no-
tion as used by Israel 
in his recent synthesis 
of the Enlightenment, 
centred on the figure 
of Spinoza, see, for 
example, La Vopa, 
2009; and Lilti, 2009. 
91
Enlightenment and Religion
Hist. Historiogr. v. 13, n. 32, jan.-abr, ano 2020, p. 83-114 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v13i32.1499
of pornographic slurs directed at the royal family, the court, 
and the clergy unearthed by Robert Darnton in the “literary 
underground” of the French Ancien Régime11. Moreover, there 
also existed something similar to a “religious Enlightenment” 
in France, independent of the more famous movement of the 
Parisian esprits forts and, according to Dale Van Kley, even 
more relevant than it in creating the political divisions that 
would later be consolidated by the Revolution12.
In his analysis of the pamphlet war (the debate over the 
General Assembly of Galician Clergy in 1765) that was the 
last of a series of mixed religious, ecclesiastical, and political 
controversies in 18th-century France, Van Kley identified 
the development of two opposing ideological positions that 
prefigured the antithesis between “liberals” and “conservatives,” 
which crystallized after the Revolution. Combining elements of 
Jansenism, Galicianism, secular conciliarism, and parliamentary 
constitutionalism, the first point of view advocated a democratic 
ecclesiastical structure that would be open to the participation 
of the laity and completely subordinate to the civil authority, 
conceived of as a constitutional monarchy. The opposing 
perspective combined elements of Molinism, ultramontanism, 
and episcopalism to argue in favour of an authoritarian, rigidly 
hierarchical church, led by the Pope, though allied with (but not 
subordinated to) an absolute monarchy.
Van Kley makes two particularly interesting comments 
concerning the relationship between these emergent political-
ideological divisions and the Enlightenment. He argues 
that the disputes occurred among Catholics, not between 
Catholics and unbelievers13. As a result, the insistence on 
the conventional identification between the Enlightenment 
and “unbelief” implies a significant restriction on the 
Enlightenment’s very participation in the debates that formed 
the basis of the main ideological divisions in 18th-century and 
revolutionary France. If, on the other hand, as he suggests, we 
understand the Enlightenment “more broadly as a set of 
appeals, whether to reason, nature, sensate experience, 
11 - See, for exam-
ple, Darnton, 1987. 
However, Darnton 
later stated his be-
lief that the Enlight-
enment itself was 
the prerogative of 
“a self-conscious 
group of intellectu-
als,” namely the phi-
losophes (DARNTON 
2003, p. 4-6). 
12 - Van Kley, 2001. 
See also Van Kley, 
1996.
13 - “In the debate 
over the general as-
sembly of 1765 there 
is moreover across-
the-board agreement 
among all partici-
pants that Catholi-
cism should function 
as the moral and spir-
itual foundation of 
the State” (VAN KLEY 
2001, p. 298).
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which replaced older ones such as to revelation and traditional 
precedents” (2001, p. 299), the difficulty becomes amenable 
to a solution, since these idioms and ideas—which included 
theories of natural law and the social contract—permeated the 
controversy across the board.
However—and this is Van Kley’s second observation—the 
use of these ideas and vocabularies that we associate with 
the Enlightenment was not an exclusive attribute of either side 
in the dispute. Although one notes a certain elective affinity 
between the Enlightenment lexicon and the “proto-liberalism” 
advocated by the Galician-Jansenist-parliamentarian alliance, 
they were equally utilized by the episcopal-ultramontane camp 
in its defence of theocratic, anti-constitutionalist socio-political 
ideas. The point is that “‘enlightened’ concepts and vocabulary 
were sufficiently elastic to accommodate themselves to 
either side of the controversy, not just one, with perhaps a 
slight tendency for the Enlightenment’s empirical side to 
run in a conservative direction, its natural rights inheritance 
in a revolutionary one” (2001, p. 299)14. If this seems like 
a paradox, it is only because in the wake of the Revolution, 
modern liberals appropriated “the Enlightenment” as the origin 
of their movement, even as their conservative adversaries 
attacked it as inherently revolutionary and “anti-religious”15. 
For Van Kley, however, while “the mixed religious, ecclesiastical, 
and political controversies generated the fundamental political 
and ideological directions of eighteenth-century France,” it is 
possible that “the Enlightenment, a broad cultural movement 
affecting the thought patterns of all literate groups, provided the 
conceptual apparatus and vocabulary in which either direction 
progressively expressed itself” (2001, p. 299).
The Enlightenment or Enlightenments?
As a noteworthy representative of the recent “religious 
turn” in scholarship, Van Kley’s work raises the pressing 
issue of the Enlightenment’s identity. If indeed, as the works 
here mentioned—and many others not mentioned—suggest, 
14 - The rather odd 
corollary to this is 
that Burke, Lamen-
nais, and De Maistre 
can just as easily be 
considered legitimate 
heirs of the Enlight-
enment as Thomas 
Paine and Benjamin 
Franklin. 
15 - On this point, see 
also Chartier, 2009.
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religious phenomena are an integral part of the Enlightenment, 
are we even talking about the Enlightenment anymore? Or, 
as Jonathan Sheehan puts it, “can a category defined by its 
opposition to superstition, faith, and revelation survive when 
this opposition disappears?” (2003, p. 1067). Like a superhero, 
the Enlightenment seems to depend upon its arch-rival, which 
bestows meaning through the combative encounter. One 
cannot exist without the other. Thus, it is not fortuitous that 
the revision of the Enlightenment’s combative relationship with 
religion has been accompanied by a revision of the unified 
nature of the Enlightenment.
As John Pocock, one of the main authors responsible for the 
tendency to split the Enlightenment into national or thematic 
variants, has recently argued, the “‘Enlightenment’ is a word 
or signifier, and not a single or unifiable phenomenon which it 
consistently signifies” (2008, p. 83)16. The target of Pocock’s 
polemical comment is not the name—the ancient metaphor of 
light, consistently used self-reflexively in the 18th century—but 
rather its later reifying use as a historical concept17. He clarifies 
that his criticism of the “concept of ‘the Enlightenment’”:
…is directed more against the article than against the noun. I 
have no quarrel with the concept of Enlightenment; I merely 
contend that it occurred in too many forms to be comprised 
within a single definition and history, and that we do better 
to think of a family of Enlightenments, displaying both family 
resemblances and family quarrels (some of them bitter and even 
bloody). To insist on bringing them all within a single formula –
which excludes those it cannot be made to fit—is, I think, more 
the expression of one’s loyalties than of one’s historical insight. 
Since we are all liberal agnostics, we write whig histories of 
liberal agnosticism; (1999, p. 9).
It is important to emphasize that this does not constitute 
a nominalist invective against the use of historical categories. 
For Pocock, although there did not exist a “single or unifiable 
phenomenon describable as ‘the Enlightenment’,” the term—
with added qualifiers like “French,” “Scottish,” “Arminian,” 
16 - Another influen-
tial work for the “dis-
aggregation” of the 
Enlightenment was 
the volume organized 
by Roy Porter and 
Mikuláš Teich, The 
Enlightenment in Na-
tional Context (1981). 
17 - As James 
Schmidt reminds us, 
“the designation ‘the 
Enlightenment’ is no-
where to be found” in 
the eighteenth-centu-
ry (SCHMIDT 2003, p. 
430). It is significant 
that the metaphor 
of light was original-
ly articulated in reli-
gious contexts. See 
Blumenberg, 1993, p. 
30–62; and Matytsin; 
Edelstein, 2018.
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“Newtonian,” etc.—can be used profitably to refer to a series 
of “connected, but not continuous” events that took place 
between the mid-18th and early-19th centuries, and that were 
similar and related, but, however, not identical (and eventually 
even antagonistic). “It would be possible to generalize about 
“Enlightenment,” without reducing “it” to a unifiable process” 
(2008, p. 83), Pocock says. Instead, he proposes considering 
it, from a narrative point of view, as “a family of intellectual 
and political programs, taking shape in several west European 
cultures between 1650 and 1700, with the shared but diversified 
intention of seeing that there should be no recurrence of the 
Wars of Religion” (1997, p. 8). By seeking to reduce the power 
of churches and sects to disturb the civil peace and challenge 
secular authority, these programs launched an attack on 
certain traditions of political theology that asserted the 
presence of God exercising his authority in the world through 
his spiritual agents. In echoing this attack, the Enlightenments 
also consisted in a series of attempts to develop a “culture of 
the mind,” based upon “commerce and manners,” “letters and 
law, and the critical capacity of reading the texts of European 
civilisation, which should enable it to function independently of 
Christian theology and anchor the life of the mind in the life of 
civil society” (1999, p. 8). These were programs, Pocock adds, 
that “ecclesiastics of many confessions might and did join,” and 
the rejection of the theology involved with them was, however, 
“intimately related with the theology it repudiates.” “Since 
Enlightenment cannot be understood apart from theology,” 
Pocock concludes, “it sometimes appears—even in its most 
viciously anti-Christian expressions—as a tissue of theological 
statements” (1999, p. 7-8).
Inspired by Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance,” 
Pocock’s polythetic understanding of the Enlightenment as a 
series of partially overlapping phenomena is the product of 
an attempt to broaden it to incorporate other geographies, 
actors (particularly Edward Gibbon and Edmund Burke), and 
practices, including religious ones, which seem to have been 
central to various events in 17th- and 18th-century Europe that 
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have been credibly called enlightened. This does not imply 
simply moving beyond France toward other regions of Western 
and Central Europe, but also beyond “philosophy” (usually 
restricted to a narrow propositional discourse) so as to create 
space within the Enlightenment for other erudite approaches 
and forms of knowledge—rhetoric, philology, antiquarianism, 
jurisprudence, biblical exegesis, ecclesiastical history—that, 
since the Renaissance and, above all, the Reformation, had 
been reshaping Europe’s historical self-consciousness. 
Over the last 20 years, a reaction arose to Pocock’s challenge 
to the unitary understanding of the Enlightenment. In response 
to the threat of fragmentation, there have been many attempts 
to restore the Enlightenment’s uniform nature. At times, these 
have been a defence of the old liberal interpretation, and, at 
other ones, more original arguments18. It would be impossible 
to examine all these works here. I would like, however, to 
briefly touch upon one that deserves attention not only for its 
remarkable clarity and sophistication, but also for its attempt to 
re-establish not only the unitary nature of the Enlightenment, 
but also the centrality of France and philosophie.
In The Enlightenment: A Genealogy, Dan Edelstein 
conceives of the Enlightenment as “a matrix in which ideas, 
actions, and events acquired new meaning.” In order to take 
part in the Enlightenment, “it was not enough simply to pen a 
materialist treatise or frequent a salon: it took the awareness, 
by oneself or others, that a particular action belonged to a set 
of practices considered ‘enlightened’” (2010, p. 13). According 
to Edelstein, this specific self-consciousness that characterized 
the Enlightenment appeared as a historical narrative that 
was first articulated in the discursive context of the so-called 
“Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns” in the late 17th 
century between members of the French literary and scientific 
academies. The importance of this local debate lies in it having 
forced its participants to reflect on “how the present compared 
with the distant past,” thereby serving as “the catalyst that 
precipitated the Enlightenment narrative” (2010, p. 45). 
18 - Notable exam-
ples include Robert-
son, 2005; Edelstein, 
2010; Israel, 2001; 
2006; 2011; and Pag-
den, 2013.
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Already fully articulated by about 1720 in works like Jean-
Baptiste Dubos’s Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la 
peinture (1719), “the narrative of the Enlightenment” took 
the following form: “the present age (siècle) was ‘enlightened’ 
(éclairé) because the ‘philosophical spirit’ of the Scientific 
Revolution had spread to the educated classes, institutions 
of learning, and even parts of the government,” generating 
“changes in society” (2010, p. 2). Thus, according to 
Edelstein, this narrative provided the basic model for all the 
subsequent accounts of the Enlightenment produced first in 
France and later diffused in the rest of Europe by the writings 
of the philosophes.
With the explicit goal of opposing the tendency to 
disaggregate the Enlightenment into a variety of national 
and thematic variants, Edelstein argues that the narrative 
forged in France between 1680 and 1720 was not simply an 
Enlightenment narrative, but rather “the narrative of ‘the 
Enlightenment,’” which, although it was appropriated and 
subsequently put to a variety of uses, retained its essential 
characteristics19. In this way, France, and, more specifically, 
a single secular discursive context (the Quarrel) became the 
original sources from which by “a process of diffusion,” “a 
singular concept of the Enlightenment was made available 
to different cultures, which in turn adapted it” (2010, p. 3). 
Although it is true that a “self-reflexive understanding of the 
historical importance and specificity of eighteenth-century 
Europe” (2010, p. 2) appeared at this moment, Edelstein’s 
claim that it took a single form and had a single origin, i.e., that 
there was only one Enlightenment narrative and consequently 
one Enlightenment that began in France and spread from 
there, seems unjustified. It is just as likely that there was a 
series of different narratives and Enlightenments, some of 
which agreed and some of which disagreed with one another, 
that appeared in a variety of contexts20. Indeed, several recent 
works have demonstrated the existence of Enlightenment ideas 
and narratives in England, the Netherlands, and the Germanic 
states that not only preceded the spread of the récit français 
19 - Edelstein repeat-
edly insists on the 
“mythological” nature 
of this narrative in or-
der to emphasize that 
is it both constructed 
and incomplete, but 
also extremely mal-
leable in its capacity 
to “support a range of 
variants without los-
ing their core identi-
ty” (2010, p. 17, 116, 
117). 
20 - This point has 
been made by James 
Schmidt, Cf. Schmidt, 
2011.
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studied by Edelstein but also differed from it, as they focused 
more on religious and political issues than on the social effects 
of the “Scientific Revolution.”21
Edelstein’s narrative genealogy cannot restore a single 
unitary account of The Enlightenment for the simple reason that 
there were other narratives. However, there is no reason to fear 
the dissolution of the Enlightenment or a loss of the category’s 
consistency and, consequently, its analytic usefulness. Nor 
do I believe that we must choose between a restrictive and 
exclusionary definition of the Enlightenment on the one hand 
and the infinite fragmentation of idiosyncratic Enlightenments. 
As William Bulman has put it, “like it or not, the Enlightenment 
is here to stay,” and will continue to play an important role 
in historical and other disciplinary research, as well as in 
broader debates about issues such as the future of democracy, 
the social effects of technology or the status of religion in 
contemporary life. However, Bulman continues, “While there 
is no getting rid of the Enlightenment, the current historical 
and historiographical moment does provide an opportunity to 
establish a fundamentally different understanding of it” (2016, 
p. 21). Thus, Dale Van Kley, for example, using an analogy 
based on optics, sees the Enlightenment as a spectrum of light 
rather than a single “irrefrangible” light. One consequence of 
this refraction of the singular Enlightenment into a spectrum 
of multiple lights—“some of which display a far more positive 
relation to aspects of the Christian religion than did Diderot’s 
French encyclopaedic one”—is precisely the fracturing of “the 
reified opposition between ‘Enlightenment’ and “religion’” 
(2016, p. 280). 
Whether or not we accept Van Kley’s spectral model for the 
Enlightenment, I believe that the point of Pocock’s critique of the 
concept is not whether we refer to it in the singular or the plural, 
but, above all, a reminder that “the keyword ‘Enlightenment’ 
is ours to use and should not master us” (2008, p. 83). We 
do not need to abandon the category, but rather use it more 
critically and self-consciously, aware that it is an umbrella term 
21 - See, for example, 
Hunter, 2006; Jacob, 
1981; Israel, 2001; 
Pocock, 1985.
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that covers a vast diversity of particular, distinct, and even 
antagonistic phenomena. By abandoning the essentialist project 
of finding “the” definition of the Enlightenment, Pocock uses 
the category as an analytic tool to examine a series of related 
but varied phenomena that, consciously or unconsciously, 
contributed to the general tendency between the mid-17th 
and early-19th centuries “of diminishing spiritual authority, or 
reconciling it with that of civil society, by the conversion of 
theology into history” (POCOCK 1999, p. 306 apud SHEEHAN 
2003, p. 1068).
Secularization
However, behind the fragmentation of the Enlightenment 
into enlightenments that are more open to religion, there lies, 
implied in Pocock’s account (and somehow maintaining the 
various fragments linked in an uncontradictory way), a linear, 
albeit ironic, narrative of “secularization.” This serves to remind 
us that the reintroduction of religion into the Enlightenment 
demands that we also rethink this slippery category in a 
way that does not turn it simply into a “shorthand for the 
inevitable (intentional or not, serious or ironic) slide of the 
pre-modern religious past into the modern secular future” 
(SHEEHAN 2003, p. 1076). For Pocock, secularization cannot 
be understood as only as the linear growth of “paganism,” 
“unbelief,” or “irreligiosity,” but rather as a complex political-
theological process of the substitution of spiritual authority with 
civil authority as European civilization’s dominant institution, a 
process that involved not only radical philosophes, but also 
clerics and theologians. Thus, in the wake of reflections by Hans 
Blumenberg, Marcel Gauchet, and Charles Taylor, the recent 
historiography on the Enlightenment has “emphasized the 
extent to which the origins of secularization should be located 
within religion itself, rather than in absolute opposition to it” 
(COLEMAN, 2010, p. 369).
In the introduction to the collection God in the Enlightenment, 
William Bulman defines “secularization” neither as a “declining 
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religious commitment, nor as a “profound institutional 
differentiation between ecclesiastical and political spheres,” 
but rather as 
…the increasing emergence of a state of acute awareness among 
elites that their own religious commitments (or lack thereof) 
constituted a choice among many available forms of belief 
(and unbelief), all of which could be held by sane (if erring and 
partly unreasonable) people, because they were the products of 
complex historical forces.” (BULMAN 2016, p. 18).
Bulman, inspired by Charles Taylor22, calls this new state 
of affairs that distinguished the Enlightenment from the 
Renaissance and Reformation (even as it was dependent on 
these previous ages) “elite secularity.” 
According to Bulman, not only did the Reformation give rise to 
unprecedented religious diversity and conflict, it also mobilized 
the scholarly practices of the late Renaissance in its confessional 
disputes to evoke a sophisticated “discourse of religious error, 
corruption, and imposture” (2016, p. 16). Despite having been 
forged in the crucible of intra-Christian sectarian disputes, this 
discourse gradually turned into a universal analytic language 
that encompassed everything from Antiquity to the New World. 
This language served as the basis for comparative histories of 
religion, motivated by the pious goal of identifying a common 
realm of theological and practical consensus among the various 
“world religions.” At the same time, the incessant scrutiny of 
the biblical text and dissemination of the discourse of religious 
corruption generated unbelief and impiety, leading some to 
reject divine revelation or adopt the notion that the Christian 
Church was nothing more than a millenarian fraud. These 
developments shaped “secularity,” a new, historicized way of 
understanding Christian identity itself. This, in turn, influenced 
the Enlightenment, understood by Bulman as the diverse set 
of answers offered to the problem of stability, peace, and civil 
prosperity in the context of religious pluralism. 
22 - For Taylor, “sec-
ularity” refers to the 
specific “conditions of 
belief” of our “Secular 
Age,” which began in 
the 18th century and 
allows belief in God to 
become “one option 
among others, and 
frequently not the 
easiest to embrace” 
(TAYLOR 2007, p. 3).
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In the mid-17th century, after a long period of devastating 
religious civil wars, “many European elites became convinced 
that religious and public life finally needed to be ordered in 
a manner that prevented religious zeal from destroying civil 
peace”. Despite favouring “the useful, the natural, the rational, 
the civil, the moral, the peaceful, the cosmopolitan, and the 
human” to the detriment of “the theological, the demonological, 
the providential, and the revealed” in their discussions, the 
various proposed answers to the Enlightenment’s fundamental 
concern with order, security, and prosperity could be “intolerant, 
absolutist, and imperialist just as easily as they could be liberal, 
egalitarian, or individualist,” and in no way did they exclude 
religious believers and institutions (2016, p. 19)23. There is 
an ironic element in Bulman’s narrative of the Enlightenment 
and secularization, just as in Pocock’s, since “despite their 
novelty, the platforms for stability that did emerge in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries [...] were built with 
the very learned resources that had sustained the confessional 
conflicts […] of the past” (2016, p. 17).
A similar attention to the role of scholarly practices in the 
production of secularization characterizes The Enlightenment 
Bible, by Jonathan Sheehan, which seeks to offer “a 
different vision of secularization, one that focuses less on 
the disappearance of religion than on its transformation and 
reconstruction” (Sheehan, 2005, p. xi). Sheehan focuses on the 
Bible, examining the transformation to which it was subjected in 
the 18th century. Inspired by Friedrich Kittler’s study of media, 
the Enlightenment is thus redefined as “the new constellation of 
practices and institutions [...] that the eighteenth century used 
to address the host of religious, historical, and philosophical 
questions inherited from the Renaissance, the Reformation, and 
the Scientific Revolution” (2005, p. xi-xii). Among these practices 
and institutions, Sheehan focuses on translation. He shows how 
17th- and 18th-century English and German scholars, mostly 
magisterial Protestants, wielding the historical-philological 
weapons of scholarship, produced a series of new translations 
into the vernacular, commentaries, and scholarly editions of 
23 - Indeed, Bul-
man goes on to add, 
“more conservative, 
authoritarian and pi-
ous forms of Enlight-
enment were present 
from the very begin-
ning.”
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the Bible in an attempt to fight off a series of assaults on the 
authority of the Bible coming from Catholics, radical Protestants 
and deists. Over time, collectively, and unintentionally, these 
commentaries and scholarly critiques of the Bible led to the 
emancipation of the text from its theological framework. When 
no longer seen as the Word of God, the Bible can take on new 
meanings and functions that are not strictly soteriological 
and become a historical source, a pedagogical tool for moral 
instruction, and a literary representation. The Enlightenment 
thus gave rise to a new “cultural” understanding of the Bible as 
a text capable of existing independently of theology, thereby 
becoming “a cornerstone of the literary, poetic, moral, and 
pedagogical values of Western civilization” (2005, p. 220).
Sheehan insists that his history of the reconfiguration 
of the Bible as cultural artefact and repository of the 
historical, moral, and literary “patrimony” of “the West,” is 
not a conventional narrative of secularization, because it 
involved “an effort not to discard, but to remake religion” 
(2005, p. 260). In this account, the Enlightenment did not 
constitute a philosophical assault on religion that led to its 
decline and abandonment, nor was it directed against the 
biblical tradition. Rather, the Enlightenment operated within 
religion and the biblical tradition, taking the shape of a serious 
and continuous hermeneutical engagement with Scripture that, 
mediated by the 18th century’s assortment of new discursive 
practices and institutions, eventually transformed its meaning 
in the modern world. Secularization here means less an erosion 
of biblical authority than its transformation into new forms, 
“not a stripping process, but a process of reconstruction, of 
productive transformation” (2005, p. 260). Antoine Lilti’s 
comment on Pocock’s view of secularization applies perfectly 
to Sheehan’s: “The great spring of European secularization 
is not to be found outside Christian thought, but in its 
heart. Modernity is not the explosive gesture of radical rupture, 
but a patient project that tradition carries out against itself” 
(LILTI 2009, p. 205-6).
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Bulman and Sheehan raise an important point, one 
rarely discussed in the various versions of the secularization 
thesis24. That is, how much was religion itself modified by the 
Enlightenment? If it did not destroy religion—which is obvious 
to any observer today—it certainly transformed religion, or, 
better yet, invented it, because if not for the Enlightenment, 
it would not even be possible to speak of “religion” in 
the way we usually do. Perhaps instead of understanding 
secularization as a linear process by which the religious world of 
the past was turned into a new secular world, it would be more 
productive, in keeping with Talal Asad’s recent suggestion, to 
envision the simultaneous birth of “secularism” and “religion,” 
or, as Brent Nongbri puts it, to consider “how we have come 
to talk about ‘secular’ versus ‘religious’ at all” (ASAD 2003; 
NONGBRI 2013, p. 4-5).
Indeed, since the 18th century, it has become common, 
both in everyday and specialized language, to refer to 
“religion” as an universal human phenomenon that exists in 
one form or another in every culture, or as a type of internal 
disposition, which involves a concern with salvation and 
practices in pursuit of that goal. That is, religion is a sphere of 
life separate from “non-religious” or “secular” spheres (e.g., 
politics, economics, or science). However, as anthropologists 
and historians of religion have pointed out, the concept of 
“religion” thus defined is fundamentally modern, with no 
equivalent in ancient languages or non-Western cultures prior 
to contact with European Christians25. Religion is not natural or 
universal, but rather the result of a recent historical process 
that involved a complex mixture of post-Reformation Christian 
disputes regarding truth, European colonial exploration, and 
the formation of modern States (NONGBRI 2013, p. 154).26 
Therefore, it is possible to say that religion was a product of 
the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment invented religion as an 
autonomous sphere of life, i.e., it led to the unprecedented 
approach of “conceptualiz[ing] the world as divided between 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’” (NONGBRI 2013, p. 5). And in this lies 
its modernity 27.
24 - A more than use-
ful guide to this long 
and intricate intel-
lectual tradition can 
be found in Monod, 
2002. 
 
25 - There is a vast lit-
erature on the difficult 
issue of the concept 
of religion. However, 
given the impossibili-
ty of dealing with it in 
depth in this article, I 
have relied on the ex-
cellent recent mise au 
point by Brent Nong-
bri (2013).
26 - In addition to 
the works referenced 
here, see also Harri-
son, 1990; Assmann; 
Savage, 2014; and 
Stroumsa, 2010.
27 - It should be 
stressed that I am 
using the shorthand 
term “Enlightenment” 
here, following Poco-
ck’s cue, to refer to a 
complex array of in-
tellectual and cultur-
al phenomena taking 
place in post-Refor-
mation European cul-
ture, such as the ones 
mentioned above. 
Therefore, in spite of 
the rather flashy for-
mulation, my claim 
here is simply that the 
modern concept of 
religion was a 
by-product of a larger 
cultural transforma-
tion that was consol-
idated in the 18th cen-
tury.
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What is Enlightenment?
As a conclusion, I would like to briefly reflect on the most 
famous of the responses to Zöllner’s question at the end of the 
18th century: Kant’s essay Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment? Removed from its original discursive context, 
this essay, read and reread ad nauseam, served as the basis for 
a series of 20th-century historical-philosophical interpretations 
of the Enlightenment, from Cassirer to Foucault, by way of 
Adorno and Horkheimer, Koselleck and Habermas. But in all 
these interpretations to which this text has been submitted, 
one aspect that has received less attention is the prominent 
role of “religion” in Kant’s response. Nonetheless, as we have 
seen, the original framework of the debate as established by 
Zöllner, places religion at the centre of the problem, where 
it would remain until the debate wound down a decade later 
without a definitive solution. According to James Schmidt, “By 
the close of the eighteenth century, answering the question 
‘What is Enlightenment’ meant exploring the relationship 
between public discussion, religious faith and political authority” 
(SCHMIDT 1996, p. 2), and Kant’s essay was no exception. 
It was a variant, albeit a highly original one, of the typical 
Enlightenment effort to find an equilibrium between the not 
always compatible demands of liberty and stability, of criticism 
and order. 
Kant sought to accomplish this through his famous, and at 
the time novel, distinction between the “private” and “public 
use” of reason. “I understand [...] to be the public use of his 
reason the use which anyone makes of it as a scholar [Gelehrter] 
before the entire public of the reading world. The private use I 
designate as that use which one makes of his reason in a certain 
civil post or office which is entrusted to him” (1996, p. 60)28. 
Kant uses the term “private” in keeping with the conventions 
of Roman civil law to indicate a sphere of contractual relations, 
while redefining “public” so as to explicitly set it apart from legal 
conventions. Instead of referring to state authority, “public,” in 
keeping with a new understanding in style at the time, refers 
28 - I have made 
small changes to the 
English translation 
where I believed it 
necessary, based on 
comparisons with the 
original German and 
the Portuguese trans-
lation.
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to the set of private individuals who had the ability, time, and 
desire to read and critique the publications that sustained the 
century’s growing literary market. The envisioned public was 
made up of scholars, members of a potential “cosmopolitan 
society” (Weltbürgergesellschaft), or, more simply, “the world.” 
While the private use of reason could, and indeed should, be 
limited on behalf of enlightenment, the public use, on the other 
hand, must not be restricted, lest it hinder enlightenment. Thus 
soldiers, citizens, and clerics, for example, as scholars would 
have every right to criticize the very orders and formulas that 
they obeyed privately.
Of Kant’s three examples, the last, which involves the 
responsibilities of the clergy, receives the most attention. 
While serving a Church, a priest is obligated to teach his 
catechumens or preach to his congregation in accordance 
with its creed, even if he has reservations about it, 
“for he has been accepted on this condition.” However, as a 
scholar he has the freedom, even the “calling,” to share his 
criticisms and proposals for improving ecclesiastical and 
religious matters. Kant insists that there is no conflict between 
the restrictions on the private use of reason and the priest’s 
conscience.
for what he teaches as a consequence of his office as an agent 
of his church, he presents as something about which he does 
not have free reign to teach according to his own discretion, but 
rather is engaged to expound according to another’s precept 
and in another’s name. He will say: our church teaches this or 
that; these are the arguments that it employs. He then draws 
out all the practical uses for his congregation from rules to which 
he himself may not subscribe with complete conviction, but to 
whose exposition he can nevertheless pledge himself, since it is 
not entirely impossible that truth may lie concealed within them 
(1996, p. 60).
There is, however, a limit to a priest’s ability to maintain 
separate his Church’s teaching and personal convictions: 
nothing in official doctrine should be contrary to his “inner 
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religion.” Should this become the case, his only option would 
be the resign his position.
The issue of the legitimacy of the confessions of faith, the 
creed to which priests were obligated to swear obedience and 
faithfulness, had become the topic of heated discussion during 
this period between defenders and critics of the practice, which 
lay at the root of the consolidation of the territorial Churches 
between the mid-16th and mid-17th centuries.29 Kant takes a 
conciliatory position on this debate, based on a fundamental 
distinction between “church” and “religion.” While church 
is understood as Locke defined it in his Letter on Toleration 
(1689) as a voluntary association, a human institution that 
it is possible to join or to leave by one’s own will, religion is 
something else entirely. Although it is universal, it is founded 
on individual conscience. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate for a 
church, just like any other type of association, to demand that 
its members adhere to specific doctrines. It is also perfectly 
possible for priests to pledge themselves to those doctrines 
and derive important practical consequences from them for 
their congregation, even if they are not entirely convinced of 
their truth, for although it is possible that they contain truth, 
in the end, there is no way to be absolutely sure of this. After 
all, for Kant, there can only be theoretical certainty about that 
which is grounded in experience. Since religion goes beyond 
experience it remains essentially a domain of practical faith.
Regardless, the freedom to speculate in this domain 
is sacred. No assembly of clerics or ecclesiastical synod 
has the right to extend the limitations of the discussion 
that hold for the restricted private sphere of contractual 
arrangements to the public sphere, thereby establishing an 
“unalterable symbol” or “permanent religious constitution” 
that cannot be questioned. This would constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle to the advance of enlightenment. It 
would, Kant says, be “a crime against human nature, whose 
original destiny consists in this progress”. It would not even 
be legitimate for a monarch, no matter how great his or her 
29 - See Schmidt, 
1992. p. 96-97.
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authority, to impede the free discussion of religious issues. 
For, “if only he [a monarch] sees to it that all true or alleged 
improvements are consistent with civil order, he can allow his 
subjects to do what they find necessary for the salvation of 
their souls” (1996, p. 61-62).
The reference to the soul’s salvation (Seelenheil) suggests 
a connection between enlightenment and that most basic 
concern of Christianity. Obviously, it is not a direct connection. 
The end goal of enlightenment is not redemption, but the 
independent use (“without the guidance of another”) of one’s 
own reason. However, it is difficult to ignore, in the way 
Kant conceives of enlightenment, echoes of the Protestant 
emphasis on the individual responsibility for salvation. The first 
reformer’s stress on the primacy of individual conscience in 
the interpretation of divine mystery—that is, the cry that each 
believer must strive alone, without intermediaries, for saving 
truth—still resounds in Kant’s definition of enlightenment. 
Enlightenment is “mankind’s exit (Ausgang) from its self-
incurred immaturity” (1996, p. 58). Mankind is guilty not 
of error, or of entertaining false notions, but rather of the 
moral lack of “resolution” and of the “courage” to abandon its 
comfortable condition of intellectual tutelage and commit itself 
to the search for truth. It is as though between the Reformation 
and the Enlightenment the emphasis shifted from truth to the 
diligent search for it. Once this search becomes independent of 
specific dogmatic content, whether true or not, it is turned into 
an end in itself, autonomy as an (“enlightened”) way of being. 
However, this way of being, or ethos, is not restricted to “religion.” 
Although Kant places “the main point of enlightenment [...] 
primarily on religious matters (Religionssachen),” he clarifies 
that the concept extends to non-religious or secular domains, 
such as “the arts,” “science,” and even “legislation.” If, as 
Sheehan has shown, scholarly hermeneutical engagement 
with the Bible eventually led to its liberation from theology 
and its reinvention in the 18th century as a cultural artefact, 
basis of the 19th-century Bildungskultur, a similar process 
seems to have occurred with the original motivation for that 
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engagement, i.e., the individual quest for salvation, which, 
untethered from its other-worldly goal, is reinvented as a quest 
for self-determination. 
This article has argued that, although the relationship 
between the Enlightenment and religion can, according to the 
recent literature, be better characterized as one of continuity 
rather than rupture, this continuity also involved substantial 
transformations, including in the very way in which religion 
was conceived. This is evident in the distinctly “modern” way 
that Kant speaks about “religion” in his essay, treating it as 
something essentially distinct from any specific church or 
creed, as more of an internal sense or private consciousness. 
The very definition of enlightenment, with its insistence on 
the idea of individual autonomy or self-determination, is not 
only not contrary to religious matters—indeed, religion is its 
central point—but also intimately associated with it through 
their common origin in that central concern of the Christian 
experience: salvation. Regardless, enlightenment indicates a 
way of life whose goal is not to transcend the earthly world, but 
rather to remake and perfect it through constant questioning 
and self-questioning.
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